General Dynamics FB-111 Aardvark by Hasegawa

1/72 scale
Kit No. K35: 1800
Price: $39.99
Decals: Three versions, all USAF
Comments: Engraved panel lines, detailed cockpit (instrument panel decals) separate leading and trailing edge slats for wings, option for four 600-gallon drop tanks, or two 600-gallon drop tanks with eight BLU-107 Durandal anti-runway bombs

History

The General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark originated from a forced marriage in 1961 between U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy requirements for new combat aircraft, with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara lurking in the background, holding the shotgun. The Air Force wanted a supersonic, tactical fighter to replace the Republic F-105 Thunderchief (another “fighter” that in practice was used almost exclusively as a bomber). The Navy, on the other hand, wanted a sub-sonic but highly maneuverable long-range fleet defense interceptor carrying multiple air-to-air missiles. Both had experimented with “swing wings” or variable geometry wings as part of the design; the Air Force with the Bell X-5, the Navy with Grumman’s XF10 Jaguar — due to performance advantages at high speeds with swept wings, and stable, low-speed handling when they were unswept.

Birth of the TFX. Both services had pursued parallel but different designs since the late 1950’s. Had they been left to their own devices, they would have developed completely separate aircraft. But in 1961, looking to save “billions” in taxpayer dollars, newly minted SecDef Robert McNamara decided to combine the Navy and Air Force projects into a single requirement, called TFX, or Tactical Fighter Experimental. The goal of TFX was to develop variants for the Navy and Air Force needs from a single airframe. The key word was “commonality.”

But as the Navy and Air Force requirements grew more refined, it became clear that the missions of the respective aircraft, and hence the designs, were in conflict. On paper the Navy had been persuaded to accept the Air Force concept (Specific Operational Requirement 183), calling for a plane that could fly 3,300 miles without refueling, carry advanced avionics, fly at sustained supersonic speed while carrying 30,000 lbs. of ordinance, and make a final high-speed low-altitude dash of at least 200 miles to its target at Mach 1.2 — in effect, a strategic bomber. The Navy on the other hand wanted a sub-sonic fleet defender with a powerful search radar, able to loiter for up to 8 hours 100 miles from a carrier group, to intercept and destroy intruding aircraft with multiple radar-guided long-range AIM-54 Phoenix missiles before they got anywhere close to the fleet — i.e., a long-range fighter/interceptor.

The Services Push Back. The Navy also insisted on changes that increased the TFX’ size and weight beyond the Air Force requirements: side-by-side crew positions, a large, 4-foot diameter radar scanner in a wide radome, and a massive internal missile bay (some of these characteristics would later appear in the A-6 Intruder as well as the F-14 Tomcat). Friction continued unabated until in August 1961 both services formally rejected the TFX as “technically unfeasible.” McNamara intervened and put out a Request for Proposal, taking a direct hand in specifying the requirements, since the Navy and Air Force could not or would not agree. Six aircraft manufacturers responded by the December 1961 deadline, and after preliminary review two proposals, from Boeing and General Dynamics, were the finalists.

Selection Board Over-ruled.  A joint US Navy-US Air Force selection board was convened to evaluate the Boeing and General Dynamics designs. In an unlikely development, after rejecting the very concept of the TFX, and strenuously resisting McNamara’s cost-saving drive toward “commonality,” the two services surprised many in the defense industry when they agreed that the Boeing design would meet both their needs. In yet another surprise and a controversial and unprecedented move at the time, McNamara rejected the selection board’s choice and announced that the TFX would be built by General Dynamics.

Congressional Investigation. The decision triggered a firestorm of criticism — and allegations that the procurement process itself had become politicized. The TFX contract was one of the largest military contracts awarded up to that time, and would mean a great many jobs. General Dynamics was headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, the home state of then-Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and Texas was expected to be a key factor in the re-election of President Kennedy in 1964. It appeared to some that the contract had been issued for maximum political gain rather than national security. Congressional hearings were held, but the matter was closed once McNamara declared his estimate that the General Dynamics design achieved 80 percent commonality between the proposed Navy and Air Force aircraft, whereas Boeing has achieved significantly less commonality — arguably achieving his all-important goal of cost savings.

With the controversy subsided, development went ahead on the F-111A for the Air Force, and the F-111B for the Navy. The F-111B would ultimately be cancelled in 1968 after protracted problems, but the F-111A flew for the first time on December 21, 1964 and entered service with the Air Force in August 1968. For its time, it was an advanced design with fully functional variable-geometry wings (the first such aircraft to enter Air Force service), state-of-the-art avionics including digital instrumentation and terrain-following radar (TFR), plus the ability to carry ordnance in an internal weapons bay as well as externally.

Transitioning.  Aircrews assigned to the early Aardvarks weren’t fooled, despite the type’s “F” designation. Colonel Joe Kittinger, vice-commander of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), one of the first units to transition into the F-111 from the F-4D Phantom II, “didn’t relish the idea of becoming a bomber pilot.” But many regarded the sophisticated avionics and never-before-seen digital screens as a quantum leap above what had come before. For F-4 back seaters, the flight controls in the F-111’s right hand seat were an improvement over what they’d experienced as Weapons System Officers in the Phantom. The dual flight controls were more fully replicated in the F-111, and had full throttle controls, including the ability to go into afterburner – which the controls in the back seat of the F-4 lacked.

The F-111’s terrain following radar (TFR) amazed pilots and WSO’s alike, but as it could be set to automatic, flying nap-of-the-Earth on auto-pilot, some crews quickly became dependent on it, which led to accidents. Crews were not selected for their knowledge of avionics, and when malfunctions occurred, some had a tendency to switch everything off and “go visual” — an alternative of limited effectiveness at night. TFR had another weakness: its forward vision could be blanked out in heavy rainstorms. Another thing crews had to get used to was that due to its weight, the F-111 usually needed full afterburner on take off.

Baptism of Fire in Vietnam. Encouraging results from its service trials prompted the Air Force to deploy F-111’s to Southeast Asia in March 1968, months ahead of the type’s official entry into Air Force service, for all-weather, night-time operations over North Vietnam in Operation Combat Lancer. This was partly motivated by a desire to stifle continued congressional opposition to the new plane; proving the aircraft in a combat environment was crucial to its survival. The USAF considered using B-58 Hustler’s instead, but the trials indicated the F-111 had better bombing accuracy. In this role the aircraft were modified to carry AN/ALQ-87 jamming pods to defeat North Vietnamese radar. In Vietnam the 474th Tactical Fighter Wing flew night-time interdiction missions in F-111’s, bombing storage areas, transport and suspected troop concentrations.

The F-111’s ECM (electronic countermeasures) were usually quite effective in Vietnam in frustrating attempts of SAM anti-aircraft sites to lock onto them for a missile launch. When Operation Linebacker II began on December 18, 1972, F-111’s were heavily involved in supporting B-52 attacks on Hanoi. They also staged independent attacks on SAM sites, MiG airfields and other military installations up through March 1973. Six F-111’s were destroyed during this period — a loss rate of 0.15 percent, the lowest of any combat aircraft during the war. F-111A’s were also used as pathfinders to lead other bombers to a target, due to their superior bombing and navigation equipment. This, combined with state-of-the art attack radar and TFR, made it an unrivaled attack aircraft that no other plane could hope to match until the F-15E Strike Eagle appeared in the 1990’s.

Front view of two Royal Australian Air Force F-111 aircraft in flight during Exercise Kangaroo, 1981.

Bombing Libya

Perhaps the F-111’s greatest moment was Operation El Dorado Canyon in April 1986, when, in response to the terrorist bombing of La Belle discothèque in West Berlin on April 5th, which killed three people (two of them American servicemen) and injured 229 (including 79 Americans), President Reagan ordered retaliatory air strikes on targets in Benghazi and Tripoli in Libya. U.S. intelligence believed that the Libyan government was directly involved in the bombing of La Belle, a nightclub known to be frequented by Americans. While the raid was viewed by some as an attempt to target Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, there was evidence of Libyan involvement in multiple attacks against Eurpoeans and Americans dating back to 1979.

F-111’s based at RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom would carry out the raid; initially a modest force of 4 to 6 Aardvarks equipped with laser guided bombs was envisioned. By April 7, 1986, two days after the Berlin bombing, it had expanded to a much larger force including U.S. Navy aircraft flying off carriers in the Mediterranean. France, Spain and Italy refused to allow overflights by an American armada of 24 F-111F’s, 4 EF-111A’s to provide ECM protection, and 29 KC-10 Extenders and KC-135 Stratotankers from which the F-111’s would need to refuel no fewer than five times, owing to the need to fly around Spain and into the Mediterranean via the Gibraltar Straits, in what would be perhaps the longest bombing mission in history (rivalled only by Operation Black Buck during the Falklands War, in which Avro Vulcan bombers flew from RAF Waddington in the UK to bomb Port Stanley Airport in the Falklands some 6,600 nautical miles away). Taking off at sundown on April 14th, the F-111 crews spent about 14 hours in the cockpit, in radio silence and mostly in darkness.

An EF-111A electronic countermeasures aircraft in formation with an F-111F.

Upon arrival, three of the EF-111A’s flown at 200 ft. with their TFR switched off to avoid detection, led the F-111F’s in to the Libyan coast and then set up offshore jamming orbits there while the remainder of the force proceeded at low altitude using TFR to strike three targets in the Tripoli area, while Navy aircraft hit targets around Benghazi to the east. Two flights of F-111’s hit Tripoli airport’s military area, while three more struck Gaddafi’s headquarters in the Al Azziaiyh compound. While the attacks inflicted less damage than anticipated, they were successful in communicating that there would be a price for terrorist targeting of Americans; Gaddafi was noticeably less belligerent toward the United States in the wake of the raid.

1991 Gulf War

F-111’s went into action again in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, deploying to Saudi Arabia just over three weeks after Saddam Hussein’s August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait. There they conducted long-range night interdiction missions once hostilities began on January 17, 1991. F-111F’s were primary elements in a massive air attack that targeted among other things a series of Iraqi air bases to neutralize the Iraqi Air Force early on. Also targeted were hydroelectric facilities and Iraq’s nuclear research center. Iraq’s air defenses were destroyed on the first night, and subsequent targeting focused on transport and communications. The F-111 was a key part of the American strategy to establish air superiority in the early hours of the war.

The F-111 was at the vanguard of American airpower as a premiere strike aircraft for over forty years before being retired in 2010. It was a cutting-edge aircraft that despite its critics proved itself in Vietnam and remained a valuable instrument of military power for a good portion of the Cold War and for two decades beyond, as America’s adversaries became less defined and more amorphous. It overcame unrealistic design specifications, inter-service conflicts, and mismanagement to become one of the most effective combat aircraft of the 20th Century, and an ancestor of an international generation of “swing-wing” designs, from the Panavia Tornado to the Rockwell B-1 bomber to the Tupolev Tu-160.

The F-111 was indeed a useful sword. The greatest tribute to the F-111 may be the opinion of it voiced by the USAF Tactical All Weather Requirements Study Group in 1978: TAWRSG recommended resuming production of the F-111, which had by then ceased, rather than buying the aircraft that replaced it, the F-15E Strike Eagle. Thirty-two years later, retirement of the F-111 met strong opposition, and it left a gap in tactical strike capability that has yet to be effectively filled. Time will tell if the Lockheed F-35 is up to the task.

The Kit

First released by Hasegawa in 1989, this strategic bomber version of the F-111 bears crisp engraved panel lines with a fair cockpit bearing raised detail on the rear bulkhead, seats and floor with individual control yokes and a separate instrument panel hood, but provides decals for the instrument panels themselves. Injection molded in crisp grey plastic, the kit consists of 182 parts, including 10 clear plastic parts for the canopy and various lights on the aircraft.

The landing gear are detailed with the wheels bearing circumferential tread and complemented by highly detailed well interiors. The intake assemblies are equally well detailed, each one consisting of six parts. Likewise the turbofan exhausts, each of these two assemblies consisting of nine parts, seven of them for an internal exhaust cone. Each wing is a four-part assembly with separate parts for the leading and trailing edge slats, with a diagram providing a side view of an assembled wing to assist with slat placement.

The fuselage is made up of two major assemblies: The nose, which includes the cockpit and the nose wheel assembly (no effort is made to depict the FB-111’s distinctive escape capsule), and the remainder of the fuselage, which houses the intake assemblies, main landing gear and turbofan exhausts. There is no internal intake trunking. Based on the illustrations in the instructions, the wings are not intended to move once attached to the fuselage. There are no warnings indicating the modeler should not use cement at this stage, and the drawing showing the attachment of the under wing ordinance at Step 18 shows the wings fully extended for take off.

A rare photo of the Air Force F-111A (wings extended) together with the Navy’s version, the F-111B, which would ultimately be cancelled in 1968, paving the way for the Grumman F-14 Tomcat.  Note the B’s shorter, stubbier nose.

In terms of ordnance, four 600-gallon drop tanks are provided, along with eight (8) BLU-107 Durandal anti-runway bombs. Bombs and drop tanks alike, along with the pylons attaching them to the aircraft, are all detailed with engraved panel lines. Modelers have the option to use all four drop tanks, or build the kit with two drop tanks inboard and a complement of Durandal bombs on the outboard pylons.  The inclusion of Durandal bombs is an unusual and interesting choice of armament. The BLU-107 is French in origin but has been outfitted on a number of American aircraft, including the A-4 Skyhawk, F-5 Tiger, F-4 Phantom, F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-111 Aardvark — and at least three of these aircraft have been fielded by the Israeli Air Force. The Durandal has been used effectively against enemy runways dating back to the 1967 Six Day War in the Middle East, creating a damage pattern that is difficult to repair, and as a penetration bomb, it could possibly be used against hardened targets such as command and control bunkers.

The Durandal is deceptive in that at a glance, it looks more like an air-to-air missile. Once dropped, it is retarded by a parachute until it faces downwards; at that point a rocket motor located in the middle of the weapon is fired. The velocity created by the rocket motor allows it to penetrate the runway, and the warhead then explodes beneath the runway for maximum damage. The only drawback to using this weapon is that to do so pilots must fly directly over the enemy runway — which is likely to be very heavily defended airspace indeed.

Markings

The kit provides decals for three versions of the FB-111, all with the United States Air Force (the only export customer was Australia). The first is for an aircraft of the 393rd Bombardment Squadron, 509th Bomb Wing, and includes “Tiger Meet” stripes for the vertical tail; the second bears the name “New Hampshire Special” on the nose, and is also a machine of the 393rd Bombardment Squadron, 509th Bomb Wing. The first two aircraft both call for a camouflage scheme of Dark Greeen, Middle Stone, and a blend of Field Grey and Middle Stone with white under surfaces.

The third aircraft also bears nose art, entitled “Rough Night” and belonging to the 380th Bomb Wing. It bears a camouflage scheme of Dark Grey, and Olive Drab mixed with 5 percent black for a slightly darker olive drab on the upper surfaces, with the under surfaces mostly covered in two different shades of dark grey with minor patches of Dark Olive Drab. Colors are called out in the Gunze Sangyo paint line only. Although they are sealed in their own clear plastic bag, the kit markings have not entirely escaped the effects of oxidation and appear to be faintly yellowed; if you can find this kit, the decals are probably best replaced with aftermarket examples.

Conclusion

This is an excellent and mostly well-detailed kit of the FB-111. There are only three notable drawbacks, for those who care about such things — the cockpit detail falls off when it comes to the instrument panels, there is no option to display the cockpit open, and although this is a variable geometry (swing-wing, for those who prefer the pedestrian term) aircraft, the wings will not move. That said, the kit has exquisite external detail, and unusual armament. Highly recommended.

References

  • General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark by Peter Davies; Air Vanguard No. 10, Copyright 2013 Opsrey Publishing, Oxford.
  • www.weaponsystems.net

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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